BEYOND ANTITRUST-THE CASE FOR CHANGE

Industrial Organization,

Adaptive FE-BE Coupling for Strongly Nonlinear Transmission Problems with Coulomb Friction

We analyze an adaptive finite element/boundary element procedure for scalar elastoplastic interface problems involving friction, where a nonlinear uniformly monotone operator such as the p-Laplacian is coupled to the linear Laplace equation on the exterior domain. The problem is reduced to a boundary/domain variational inequality, a discretized saddle point formulation of which is then solved using the Uzawa algorithm and adaptive mesh refinements based on a gradient recovery scheme. The Galerkin approximations are shown to converge to the unique solution of the variational problem in a suitable product of L^p- and L^2-Sobolev spaces.Comment: 27 pages, 3 figure

Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, and Antitrust Policy

The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the rule of reason in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the per se\u27 and rule of reason results. Indeed, in some circumstances, commentators and an occasional court have argued that buyers should be allowed to collude together simply to fix prices or allocate inputs. Conversely, many courts and commentators seem unaware of the potential risks that apparently legitimate buying groups can pose to the competitive process. The goal of this Article is to explicate, evaluate, and critique the differences between buyer cartels and buying groups and the resulting antitrust liability rules. First, effective policy must identify the factors both internal to such a group as well as the external market conditions that justify alternative characterization of the entity. Second, empirical studies and reported cases both demonstrate that buyer power arises from much smaller market shares than is usually associated with seller power. Third, the economic incentives of buyer cartels require modification of the standard predictions that antitrust law uses to facilitate the inference of agreement. Fourth, and finally, legitimate buying groups, although efficient responses to the needs of their participants, can also pose real threats to the long-term competitiveness of both the supply and demand sides of the market

Some properties of the dissipative model of strain-gradient plasticity

A theoretical and computational investigation is carried out of a dissipative model of rate-independent strain-gradient plasticity and its regularization. It is shown that the flow relation, when expressed in terms of the Cauchy stress, is necessarily global. The most convenient approach to formulating the flow relation is through the use of a dissipation function. It is shown, however, that the task of obtaining the dual version, in the form of a normality relation, is a complex one. A numerical investigation casts further light on the response using the dissipative theory in situations of non-proportional loading. The elastic gap, a feature reported in recent investigations, is observed in situations in which passivation has been imposed. It is shown computationally that the gap may be regarded as an efficient path between a load-deformation response corresponding to micro-free boundary conditions, and that corresponding to micro-hard boundary conditions, in which plastic strains are set equal to zero.Comment: 26 pages, 10 figure

The Incoherent Justification for Naked Restraints of Competition: What the Dental Self-Regulation Cases Tell Us About the Cavities in Antitrust Law

There is an inescapable inconsistency between the general rule that naked (cartelistic) restraints of competition are per se illegal and the treatment of such restraints when engaged in by self-regulatory professional organizations, standard setting organizations, and various private organizations that regulate competition in variety of athletic and other activities. Most observers believe that some of that cartelistic regulation may be not only socially and economically desirable but also necessary to serve the public interest. The judicial effort to explain when cartels or other naked restraints on competition within or between such groups and others are lawful and when they are not has floundered on the lack of specificity of the “rule of reason” which invites linking any justification for a restraint to some ambiguous assertion of “reasonableness.” The inevitable implication is that any cartel could be lawful if it were reasonable and served some “procompetitive,” “consumer welfare,” or other “public interest” goal. This Article contends that this approach is wrong. Instead, what courts are in fact doing is preempting certain kinds of restraints from antitrust law review, although this is evident only by implication. This Article applies the Carstensen-Roth framework to explain such preemption or exemption. Three elements are necessary: state law, federal law, constitutional law, or some generally accepted public interest goal must authorize the organization to regulate some aspect of the market, the regulation at issue must be within the scope of that authorization, and the process used to adopt and implement the regulation must be appropriate under the circumstances. Naked restraints satisfying these elements are exempt from antitrust law review, and courts applying antitrust law should not undertake to determine the substantive “reasonableness” of such regulations. This framework adheres to the general rule that naked restraints of competition are always per se illegal unless exempt and provides a clearer basis for determining when and whether a restraint can be lawful. The three Supreme Court decisions reviewing FTC challenges to conspiracies among dentists to restrict and regulate competition in dental care provide the basis to illustrate and test this approach

Antitrust Law, Competition, and the Macroeconomy

This article examines the links between antitrust law-one possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assumptions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness of macroeconomic tools. Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the short run, when dissipation is impossible. Finally, Part III examines the role of antitrust policy in the macroeconomy. The article concludes that effective enforcement of antitrust law is consistent with and beneficial to a healthy, competitive economy, and should be preserved and expanded as a tool for combating economic stagnation

Explaining Tort Law: The Economic Theory of Landes and Posner

A Review of The Economic Structure of Tort Law by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posne